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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
ASSESSING TAX INSPECTION PERFORMANCE:   
A DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS ON BRAZILIAN FEDERAL TAX 
OFFICES 
 
By 
 
De Carvalho Couy, Joao Paulo 
 
 
 
The search for operational efficiency has caused a series of organizational 
changes for the Secretariat of the Federal Revenue of Brazil (RFB). A large 
number of them are taking place on tax inspection projection, whose activities 
have been shifted to regional groups. As the restructure trend seems to only 
be beginning, it is necessary to evaluate the performance of the current 
structure in order to guide the forthcoming changes.  
 
The present thesis makes use of Data Envelopment Analysis to rank local 
offices according their tax inspection performance. The study identified the 
potential outputs that were not achieved, the best and worst performing units, 
as well as the relation between their performance and geographic 
characteristics.  
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1.  Introduction 
Since its creation in 1965, the Secretariat of the Federal Revenue of 
Brazil (RFB) – the federal department responsible for the administration of 
federal taxes, customs operation and social security contributions – organizes 
its field operations geographically. Local units physically spread throughout 
the country are responsible for executing almost all of the RFB’s mandates. 
Even though this structure has historically allowed the institution to 
have greater knowledge of local differences, there have been studies 
suggesting that it can cause operational inefficiencies within RFB’s human 
resources management1 and working specialization. 
The development of information and communications technologies 
(ICT) in the past decades has allowed for significant innovation in the way 
organizations structure their activities. According to OECD (2013), a world-
wide trend has been observed that involves this change in the structure of tax 
administrations. 
The RFB is no exception, and some initiatives show that the institution 
is changing the organization used to execute its mandates – especially in the 
field of tax inspection. With new technologies available, inspection activities 
can be executed with less geographical dependency. Since 2010, the large-
taxpayers’ inspection procedures are executed by means of a regional 
structure, rather than locally. By the end of 2014, there are plans to extend 
this formula to all inspection procedures as well as to tax return assessment – 
currently performed by local units. 
                                            
1 Abranches (2011) 
  11
The RFB’s tax inspection function is clearly becoming less 
geographically-driven. 
Nevertheless, the research to evaluate the past and forthcoming 
changes within the Secretariat is little to none. What local units are executing 
their tax inspections function most efficiently? Where are they located? Does 
geographical organization influence tax inspection performance?  
The knowledge of these aspects is important not only for management 
evaluation, but also to base future changes to the organization of RFB. In 
order to answer those questions, the present work uses Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) to assess the tax inspecting performance of RFB’s local 
offices in the 2009-2013 period. 
1.1. Research Questions 
The questions guiding the present research are the following: 
 What are the RFB’s best performing units in terms of tax inspection 
results? 
 Is tax inspection performance influenced by the RFB’s geographic 
division of activities?  
1.2. Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to evaluate the RFB’s 
operational offices in terms of its tax inspection function. Therefore, the study 
intents to classify the network of local units by their performance in this 
function, identifying which of them use resources most efficiently to deliver 
their respective outputs. 
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 The research also aims to analyze the geographical features of best 
and worst units in order to determine whether or not performance is 
influenced by the RFB’s geographic organization. 
1.3. Scope and Assumptions 
The Secretariat is a very complex organization. Its network of local 
offices has to execute a wide range of activities to fulfill the RFB’s institutional 
and legal mandates. Taxpayer services center, customs administration, tax 
collection, dispute resolution, to cite a few. 
In order to complete a performance study of such a complex 
organization, it is necessary to limit the scope to be examined. The following 
limitations and assumptions were used in the research. 
1- The customs function is heavily dependent on geographical 
position. It is mainly executed on the country’s border. Many 
customs activities can be “internalized”, but its main 
objectives and activities are still geographically driven. 
Therefore, RFB’s customs units will not be considered in this 
work. 
2- The RFB also has specialized units for tax collection, tax 
inspection, for Large Taxpayers and for Financial Institutions. 
Those units are not in the scope of the included research, as 
their characteristics are not comparable to those of a regular 
local unit. 
3- In accordance with federal law, the RFB has one type of 
career and two job titles: tax auditors and tax analysts. To the 
former, legal power is given to execute core activities – 
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inspecting, dispute resolution, assessment, penalties 
constitution, etc., The latter has auxiliary functions – mainly 
administrative tasks, such as procurement, technology 
support, etc. The terms staff and workers will be used to refer 
to both of the job titles. The term tax officials will be used as a 
synonym for tax auditors. 
1.4. Relevance 
Any business enterprise whose organizational structure does not allow 
resource optimization and is not aligned with the institution’s strategic plan is 
likely to fail to accomplish its mission. In the case of a country’s revenue 
administration, the organizational factor can be considered an even more 
delicate issue, considering that “business” outputs, revenue collection, are the 
main financial source for a nations’ public services and social welfare system.  
Events such as the 2008-20092 world economic crisis indicate that the 
Brazilian Federal Tax Administration 3  will need extraordinary technical 
expertise and operational flexibility to maintain the growth of collected 
revenue. The global economy increases the quantity and complexity of tax 
related operations and, consequently, possibilities for tax evasion. At the 
same time, concerns about national fiscal imbalance impose severe 
limitations to RFB’s resources. Graph 1 shows the evolution of RFB’s tax 
                                            
2 In 2009, the federal tax revenue’s growth fell for the first time in 6 years. 
3 It is important to note that the terms tax administration and revenue administration are 
commonly use to describe both the state’s power to levy and collect tax and the public 
organization – the agency, department, etc. – responsible for the necessary activities to 
collect taxes. To avoid confusion, in the present work it will be using capital letters when 
referring to the latter.  
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auditors vis-à-vis the country’s gross domestic product, and explains the 
scenario. 
In order to cope with higher demands and fewer resources, higher 
levels of working efficiency within the Secretariat are indispensable.  
Graph 1 - Tax Auditors vs. GDP Evolution 
 Source: COGEP4; IBGE5 
In the search for higher efficiency, a series of organizational changes 
has been implemented. Since 2010, tax inspection activities are no longer an 
exclusive mandate of local units. Regional groups became responsible for 
large-taxpayers inspections as an attempt to gain economies of scale and 
specialized environments. Likewise, there are signs that tax return 
assessment and other inspection activities will be also performed by regional 
groups. 
In order to promote these changes in the best possible fashion, it is 
essential to identify the current best practices in tax inspection as well as 
understand the influences of the current organizational model on performance. 
                                            
4 RFB’s Human Resources Coordination 
5 Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. http://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/ 
Accessed in December 2014. 
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1.5. Thesis Outline 
To better contextualize the issues involved in the research and to 
deliver the work findings, the present study is organized as follows:  
Initially, Chapter 2 will discuss the main theoretical aspects involved in 
the study. It will start with the theory of the organization focusing in the case of 
Tax Administrations. Then the RFB’s key features and current organization 
will be explored. Finally, the method applied in the research will be discussed. 
Chapter 3 will cover the theoretical framework for this research – the 
DEA and its aspects, as well as the variables chosen. 
The results will be evaluated in chapter 4, which will be followed by a 
final discussion of findings, presented in chapter 5. 
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter presents a discussion of the theoretical research aspects. 
Initially, the theory of organizations will be introduced, contextualized for Tax 
Administrations. It will be shown how these institutes are academic revised in 
terms of structural organization. An examination of RFB’s current organization 
arrangement follows. Finally, the theory of Data Envelopment Analysis is 
presented as a basis for the next chapter’s development. 
2.1. Theory of Organization in Tax Administration 
Virtually all nations rely on revenue collection to obtain the necessary 
financial resources to implement public policies and services. Society 
demands education, security and healthcare – among many other forms of 
public infrastructure – that are ultimately supported by the collection of taxes.  
According Alink and Kommer’s (2000) definition, Tax Administrations 
are organizations whose core business activity is “the levy and collection of 
taxes”. In other words, it is the public organization responsible for executing 
the activities required to guarantee tax law enforcement and offer necessary 
services so taxpayers can fulfill their own obligations. 
Given the importance of those functions, governments around the 
globe pay close attention to their Tax Administrations in an effort to achieve 
the most effective revenue collection possible.  
An essential part of the pursuit of revenue maximization is defining the 
right organizational arrangements for the institution responsible for this activity. 
According to the OECD (2013), the organizational structure of national Tax 
  17
Administrations has recently been “the subject of major reform” to increase 
“operational efficiency and effectiveness”.  
In this subchapter, the main features of those organizational models 
will be reviewed. 
2.1.1. Tax‐type Organizational Structure  
The OECD (2013) states that the early choice of 53 researched nations 
was to structure their Revenue Administration based on the “tax-type” 
organization. This kind of model would display a number of departments 
executing all tax-related functions, each of them doing it for a different tax 
category. The units “were […] self-sufficient and independent of each other”. 
(ibid.) 
The work of Alink and Kommer (2000) calls this structure the “tax law 
approach”, and holds that the working division is generally made between 
state taxes, customs duties and social security contributions.  
Even though the tax type structure can bring some level efficiency by 
facilitating specialization and making it “easier to integrate tax collection with 
auditing”6 functions, it is a costlier solution both for the government – as it 
duplicates operational function – and taxpayers – who have to deal with more 
than one department to solve a same issue.  
According to Crandall and Kidd (2010), international experience proved 
that structuring departments for different taxes “perpetuates inefficiencies and 
duplication of staff, facilities, resources and effort, and is not conducive to 
                                            
6 Alink and Kommer (2000), 53. 
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taxpayer compliance.” These problems led to a development of new 
structuring solutions, discussed in the following. 
2.1.2. Functionally‐oriented Structure 
Given the inefficiencies detected in the tax-type structure, Tax 
Administrations have been searching for new solutions to operate. According 
to the research made by OECD (2013), they are more commonly opting for 
the “functional” approach. Under this type of organization, the Revenue 
Organization is grouped by functional groups, such as “audit, collection, 
appeals, etc.,”7 normally executing these activities for all kinds of taxes.  
Kidd (2010) defines function-based organization as “one structured on 
the basis of the type of work performed, rather than the type of business or 
product or the type of customer,” and states that a Tax Administration under 
this model achieves  “real gains […] through an increased depth of knowledge 
in core areas of business expertise.”  The development of expertise naturally 
leads to gains of scale as mastered processes and activities are executed 
more efficiently.  
2.1.3. Taxpayer‐type Structure 
The search for further operational specialization has developed an 
organizational model in which the division of work is made based on the 
taxpayer characteristics. According to Alink and Kommer (2000), 
categorization can be made according to the nature of the taxpayers – 
individuals or companies –, their size – small, medium or large –, or the 
activity they perform – financial companies, government institutions, etc. The 
                                            
7 OECD (2013), 59. 
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rationale behind this form of organizational structure is that specialization will 
occur by mastering the specific compliance and service demands that each 
taxpayer segment requires, and gain efficiency through the “tailored treatment 
approach.”8  
Although client-type restructuring should not yet be seen as a general 
tendency, a hybrid model of it has been largely applied throughout the world. 
Recent research in the field indicates that only the United States of America 
and Australia have completely adopted this model, but it also affirms that “the 
vast majority of revenue bodies surveyed have established special dedicated 
units” to deal with large taxpayers.9  
2.1.4. Geographical Model and Field Operations Structure 
It can be said that geography is always a factor involved in the 
determination of the Tax Administration organizational model. This might 
explain why the OECD does not mention this approach as type of model on its 
own. Nonetheless, Alink and Kommer (2000) reminds us that the 
geographical model is “the most common form and makes an ideal 
combination with other approaches.” Under this model, the work division is 
made according to the physical location of taxpayers: a number of 
regional/local offices offers services and guarantees enforcement within a 
delimited area. 
As mentioned, all other organizational models use the geographical 
approach, especially in the design of the network of operational offices. It can 
be seen as a form of division of labor, and the rationale behind it support that 
                                            
8 OECD (2013), 60. 
9 Ibid., 84. 
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the delivery of better services can be made closer to the taxpayers. This 
includes not only services, but also eased enforcement due to the fact that the 
institutions have the opportunity to better understand regional and local 
economic activities.  
For those reasons, Tax Administrations tend to adopt geography as 
the critical factor to structure their networks of field offices. The historical 
necessity to be in close proximity to individuals and companies makes “all 
revenue bodies [to] operate with office networks which are geographical and 
hierarchical.” The resulting structure normally consists of “large numbers of 
regional and/or local offices to carry out the full range of functions required for 
effective administration of tax laws.”10  
This uniformity across countries may explain why not much theoretical 
discussion has been made about the organization of operational offices. The 
debate is also affected by the variety of aspects to be taken into account 
when structuring the network of operational offices – the country’s size, its tax 
law and mandates, etc. The differences might not allow a feasible general 
discussion of the issue. 
Nonetheless, the debate is likely to increase.  
As ICT modifies the way tax activities are executed, initiatives to adjust 
the operational offices to this new technological reality are observed. A recent 
study11 shows that countries are seeing the redesign of “the administration 
(and related process redesign and automation) as a high priority area for (…) 
delivering savings/efficiency gains.”  
                                            
10 OECD (2013), 58. 
11 OECD (2012), 02. 
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The next section discusses the origins for this structural redesign trend, 
which is founded on the operational evolution of tax activities. 
2.1.5. Operational Evolution and Organizational Structure 
Camp (2009) is one of the most comprehensive summaries of the 
evolution of technology and operations on Tax Administrations’ activities. The 
article analyzes the progressive use of Automated Data Processing (ADP) in 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) – the federal revenue administration in the 
United States of America –, and its findings can be easily expanded to any 
national Tax Administration.  
Computational tools transformed the processing capability of tax 
administrations, and produced a notable increase in the quantity of taxpayers 
audited and served by these institutions. The automation of activities has 
significantly reduced human intervention in various tax-related activities 
because it allows efficient concentration of processes. This consolidation 
consequently lowers the need for physical proximity between tax officials and 
the taxpayers. For that reason, Tax Administrations around the world are 
showing “strategies […] to redesign their organization towards a more 
centralised approach.”12  
This trend of transformations is at the core of the present research: 
organizational changes to adapt to the new operational possibilities in the tax-
related activities and achieve higher working efficiency. The following section 
brings this discussion to the Brazilian Federal Tax Administration reality. 
                                            
12 OECD (2012), 15. 
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2.2. The RFB’s Current Organizational Structure 
Before exploring the structural aspects of the Secretariat of the Federal 
Revenue of Brazil, it is important to contextualize the tax system that it is part 
of. 
2.2.1. The Brazilian Tax System 
Brazil is a federative country that displays a considerable level of 
decentralization among its three federative entities: federal, state and local 
(municipal) governments. The nation is composed of 27 states (including the 
Federal District where the country’s capital is located) and more than 5,500 
municipalities. One of the decentralized authorities granted to these 
governments by the country’s constitution is tax jurisdiction. Subsequently, the 
tax system in Brazil is formed by Tax Administrations from all of these 
federative entities. 
However, in terms of revenue collection, the Federal Tax 
Administration is by far the most representative. In the year 2011, the revenue 
collection in the country totaled 35,31% of its GDP.13 The smallest share, 1.95% 
of GDP, was collected by municipalities, followed by the 26 states and 
Federal District that together gathered 8.63% of GDP in taxes. The highest 
collection parcel is from the federal government, whose revenue was 
equivalent to 24,73% of GDP that year.  
                                            
13 RFB (2012) 
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Graph 2 - Distribution of Brazilian Tax Collection in 2011 
  
Source: RFB (2012) 
Graph 2 above indicates the national significance of the Secretariat of 
the Federal Revenue of Brazil: the agency is responsible for 70% of all 
revenue collected in Brazil. 
2.2.2. The RFB: a brief background 
As shown in the previous section, the RFB is the most important tax 
authority in Brazil. It is a single directorate subordinate to the Ministry of 
Finance, and has exclusive authority to “levy and administer taxes on 
personal income, corporate income, payroll, wealth, foreign trade, banking, 
finance and insurance, rural property, hydroelectricity and mineral 
resources.”14 
 The Secretariat’s current organizational structure was developed in 
1968. In that year, the RFB was created to replace the General Directorate of 
National Finance (DGFN) – an institution that used to be organized with 
different departments according to tax type: income tax, customs duties and 
other internal tax.  
                                            
14 OECD (2011), Appendix A 
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With the RFB’s creation, the federal Tax Administration migrated from 
the tax-type structure, merging the tax and customs administration. Later, in 
2007, the Secretariat also incorporated the mandate to levy and administer 
social security contributions. 
2.2.3. RFB Organizational Analysis 
The Secretariat currently has a functional structure composed of a 
strong headquarters located in Brasília – the country’s capital – and a network 
of operational offices. The former are responsible for the planning and 
supervision of tax policies. The operational tax activities (collection, auditing, 
customs control, taxpayer services, etc.) are executed by the latter – a 
number of decentralized units geographically organized to deliver those 
functions.  
2.2.4. Operational Offices 
The RFB’s network of operational offices is organized into 10 regional 
management divisions – called “fiscal regions” – as shown in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1 - Fiscal Regions 
Each of the fiscal regions manages operational offices through a 
hierarchy within its region’s territory. In the last 50 years, the initial strict 
geographical approach for the operational office organization has evolved 
along with the introduction of function-based and, more recently, client-type 
units.  
The following chart shows the quantities of decentralized units for each 
fiscal region. As mentioned in the Scope and Assumptions section, the 
present research will focus only on the regular local offices. This type of unit is 
set to apply locally to all tax related functions – from taxpayer services to tax 
inspection activities. 
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Chart 1 - Type of decentralized units 
 Fiscal Region 
Type of Unit 1st 2nd 3th 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Total
Customs Office 1 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 2 26 
Customs 
Inspection Office 6 15 6 3 1 1 2 9 12 55 
Taxpayers Services 
Center 33 22 35 31 33 41 21 64 42 38 360 
Dispute Resolution 
Offices 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 15 
Special Office for 
Tax Inspection   1   1 
Special Office for 
Financial 
Institutions        1   1 
Special Office for 
Large Taxpayers   1 1   2 
Special Office for 
High Net Worth 
Individuals 
     1     1 
Special Office for 
Collection 
Administration        1   1 
Special Office for 
Individuals        1   1 
Special Office for 
International Trade        1   1 
Regular Local 
Office 7 9 7 7 6 12 8 21 11 9 97 
Total 49 51 47 47 45 57 36 100 67 62 561 
Adapted from http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/SRF/UnidadesDescentralizadas/estrutura.htm. 
Accessed in December 2014. 
2.2.5. Tax Inspection Function 
The RFB’s tax inspection function is mainly executed by the local 
offices. As seen in Chart 1, by 2014 there were 97 of these offices spread 
throughout the country.  
This considerable number of local offices is a consequence of the 
Secretariat’s historical need for proximity to the taxpayers. Without the 
technological tools available in the present day, tax forms were filled 
exclusively by hard copy, corporate accounting acts were registered in large 
heavy books, and assessment took place in the taxpayer’s presence. 
Efficiency was heavily dependent on proximity to citizens and corporate 
entities for faster and safer exchange of information. 
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 However, ICT development allowed for significant modifications on tax 
operations. Today, virtually all tax return forms are filled through a piece of 
computational software and are submitted to the tax administration via 
internet. Additionally, companies are recording their accounting activity 
electronically and storing information in database systems. Moreover, digital 
tools have facilitated taxpayers’ self-assessment and self-assistance. 
This operational evolution allowed the Secretariat to consolidate 
investigation and inspection procedures for large taxpayers in 2010. Since 
then, every RFB fiscal region coordinates a group that is responsible for 
executing these tasks. There is a general perception that the initiative was 
successful, and more changes are expected to come. 
There have been trials within the Secretariat that indicate all tax 
inspection activities will be concentrated in the short term. This move will 
modify the 50-year-old organizational structure for the activity of tax inspection. 
This scenario leads to the belief that the present research plays a key 
role in the organizational transition. The study has an unprecedented goal: to 
classify the tax inspection performance of local offices through Data 
Envelopment Analysis. It will give a blueprint of this activity in the present 
organization and serve as a basis for the establishment of new structures. 
The theoretical aspects of DEA are shown in the next section. 
2.3. Data Envelopment Analysis 
The research used the method Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to 
evaluate tax inspection performance among RFB’s operational offices. Here is 
a brief discussion of the method’s theoretical characteristics.   
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2.3.1. Definition and Background 
According to Cooper, Seiford and Zhu (2004), DEA is a “data oriented 
approach for evaluating the performance of a set of peer entities called 
Decision Making Units (DMUs) which convert multiple inputs into multiple 
outputs.” The same work states that the concept of DMU is flexible and 
applications of DEA “have used DMUs of various forms to evaluate the 
performance of entities, such as hospitals, US Air Force wings, universities, 
cities, courts, business firms, and others, including the performance of 
countries, regions, etc.”15  
The method was first presented in 1978 and its authors highlighted 
their intention to create possibilities to evaluate “not-for-profit entities rather 
than the more customary 'firms' and 'industries'.” 16  Given that market 
measures – such as price and cost of production – are normally not applicable 
to not-for-profit organizations, the method uses data variables to empirically 
estimate production relations. In the authors’ words, it is a “mathematical 
programming model applied to observational data [that] provides a new way 
of obtaining empirical estimates of relations - such as the production functions 
and/or efficient production possibility surfaces.”17 
DEA can thus be defined as a non-parametric methodology that uses a 
set of data (inputs and outputs) to compare relative efficiency or performance.  
The method works with the concept of frontiers of efficiency instead of central 
tendencies normally seen in statistical regression. 18  The efficient DMUs 
                                            
15 Cooper, Seiford and Zhu (2004), 02. 
16 Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), 429. 
17 Cooper, Seiford and Zhu (2004), 02. 
18 Cooper, Seiford and Zhu (2004) 
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delineate the surface enveloping non-efficient units and serve as referent to 
the latter. 
Figure 2 - DEA frontier 
  
Souce: CMTE (2013) 
2.3.2. Applications and Limitations 
According to Golany and Roll (1989) the method’s application requires 
comparable units (executes the same tasks and has similar objectives), that 
these units be under the same “market conditions”, and that inputs/outputs be 
the same except for their magnitudes. 
The resulting DEA study will display, among others: an efficient frontier 
formed by the best practice units; a measurement of inefficiency that consists 
of “the distance from each unit to the frontier”; and targets for the inefficient 
units.19 
Although a flexible and robust method, some DEA characteristics can 
limit its use: data noise “such as measurement error can cause significant 
problems”; the method works with relative efficiency rather than absolute 
efficiency; being a nonparametric technique, it is difficult to use in the case of 
                                            
19 CMTE (2013) 
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hypothesis tests; and the use of DEA can demand huge computational effort 
due to its linear programing nature.20  
2.3.3. Model Orientation and Basic Types 
DEA can be applied to be either input or output oriented. If the analysis 
is to emphasize reduction of inputs, the former is used, while the latter is 
normally used when the evaluation is guided by output augmentation of a 
given set of inputs. 
The DEA models can also be classified according to the scale involved 
in the problem to be assessed. The two basic formulations are the constant 
return of scale (CRS) – the choice for cases where it can be assumed that 
output increases (decreases) proportionally to an input increase (decrease); 
and the variable returns-to-scale (VRS) model, used when a change on inputs 
causes not proportionate variation on outputs. 
Ozcan (2008) summarized the basic DEA model as in the Figure 3. 
                                            
20 Trick (1998) 
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Figure 3 - DEA basic model classification 
  
Source: Ozcan (2008) 
2.3.4. DEA to Evaluate Tax Office Performance 
DEA is believed to be very appropriate to this study’s objectives. The 
model will identify the RFB’s best performing local offices, consider them 
efficient and assign them a score of one. These efficient offices will then serve 
as a comparison reference to all other units – offices will be considered 
inefficient if they “require relatively more weighted inputs to produce weighted 
outputs or, alternatively, produce less weighted output per weighted inputs 
than” efficient offices.21 The inefficient offices receive a score greater than 
zero but less than one. 
The performance evaluation of tax offices using DEA has been 
consistently carried out in the literature. Førsund, Kittelsen and Lindseth 
(2005) did it for Norwegian tax offices, while Barros (2005) and Katharaki and 
Tsakas (2010) did it for Portuguese and Greek tax offices, respectively. 
The work of Moesen and Persoon (2002) – which evaluated 289 
Belgian tax offices – is the work most closely related to the present study, as 
both similarly define inputs and outputs. The following chapter discusses the 
methodology steps in detail.  
                                            
21 Ozcan (2008), 25. 
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3. Methodology 
The research aims to evaluate performance of the RFB’s operational 
offices with respect to its tax inspection function. In order to do so, Data 
Envelopment Analysis will be used, a methodology first proposed by Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978). 
Since its first application, the model has been largely used to evaluate 
relative organizational performance. It was first intended to apply in the public 
sector in which economic variables (such as profit) may not be present – 
which is exactly the case in this research.  
According to Golany and Roll (1989), a DEA study may follow three 
steps: (a) definition and selection of DMUs; (b) determine adequate input and 
output factors; and (c) application of DEA model and subsequent results 
analysis. The study was done over a 5-year period - from 2009 to 2013. 
3.1. Universe Delimitation 
By the end of 2013, the RFB field operations were made by 561 
decentralized offices (see Chart 1). Of these, there were a total of 360 
taxpayer service units that didn’t have tax inspection activities. Also, 81 offices 
dealt exclusively with customs activity. Even though inspection activities exist 
in customs units, their nature is not comparable to a regular decentralized unit, 
and these customs offices were not considered in the study.  
Of the remaining 120 offices, there were 27 units organized by 
specializations – collections office, large taxpayers offices, dispute resolution 
units, etc. These were also excluded from the investigation because their 
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internal departmentalization is very different from a regular decentralized 
office and the method requires comparable DMUs. 
The total sum of offices considered in the research is shown in Chart 2 
below and the complete list of these DMUs can be seen in APPENDIX A – 
List of DMUs. For confidentiality reasons, the offices will be represented in 
this work by a code.22 
Chart 2 - Number of Offices (DMUs) Considered in the Study 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number of offices 94 94 95 97 97 
3.2. Variables 
One of the main goals of the tax inspection function is “fiscal presence” 
– to display fiscal authority in order to promote taxpayer compliance. And 
within the RFB, this goal is performed roughly through two activities. 
The most important tax inspection activity is inspection procedures. It is 
a classic task in which a tax auditor has to investigate whether or not a 
taxpayer’s economic operations were taxed according to the law. This activity 
is generally completed out-of-office, and the selection of a taxpayer for 
inspection is made through internal intelligence techniques.  
The second most representative inspection activity is the assessment 
of individuals’ tax return forms. This activity is normally performed in-office by 
tax auditors and consists of a manual revision of return forms with trace 
irregularities. Forms to be revised are automatically selected by a 
computational system.  
                                            
22 The code is composed by the Portuguese anachronism for local office “DRF” followed by a 
first number to represent its fiscal region (1 to first region until 0 for the tenth) and sequential 
numbers to enumerate the office. For example, the DRF89 is the unit number 9 of the 8th 
fiscal region.  
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There are a few other activities executed within the tax inspection 
function, but they were not considered significant enough to evaluate 
performance. 
3.2.1. Outputs 
The natural outputs for the study would be the total number of return 
forms manually assessed, and inspection procedures executed per year in 
each office. 
However, the inspection procedures have a strategic purpose: with a 
limited number of officials to investigate a massive number of tax infractions, 
ideally every procedure will successfully identify an infraction. When it fails to 
do so, the limited inspection power available is hindered. Consequently, the 
performance evaluation should not count a failed procedure as output.  
Therefore, the chosen outputs for the model are: 
a) The total number of return forms manually assessed; 
b) The total number of successful inspecting procedures executed. 
3.2.2. Inputs 
The technology to execute these two activities is basically the same 
throughout the analyzed offices. It is therefore realistic to affirm that the 
number of workers is the only substantial constraint varying among the DMUs. 
As explained in Section 1.3, there are two job positions within the RFB 
profession. Tax auditors are the only position with the legal mandate to 
execute both activities – return forms assessment and inspection procedures. 
Thus, the number of tax auditors working in the office must be one of the 
model’s inputs. 
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Even though none of the outputs are directly executed by tax analysts, 
these workers are indispensable for a well-functioning local office. They play a 
key role in the execution of other activities locally executed. Therefore, it is 
expected that the number of tax analysts will influence inspection 
performance, and it will represent the second input for the model.  
In summary, the inputs are: 
a) The total number of working tax auditors per office; 
b) The total number of working tax analysts per office. 
3.3. Data 
The data used in the research – inputs and outputs – were all extracted 
from RFB’s intern systems and controls. 
Inputs – number of auditors and analysts – were obtained from the 
RFB’s Human Resources Coordination – COGEP. The position was only 
taken into account for December of each year, as changes during the year are 
not representative.  
Output figures were extracted from the system controlled by the RFB’s 
Tax Inspection Coordination – COFIS. For the first output – number of 
procedures yearly executed – the final number was found by adding the total 
number of procedures per tax type. This means that if one procedure 
inspected, for example, two different types of taxes, this procedure was 
counted as two outputs. The counting approach was used to consider the 
inspection’s difficulty in the total output. 
The total number of personal return forms analyzed – second output – 
was obtained by considering only the forms assessed by a tax auditor. 
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3.4. DEA Model 
Given the study’s objectives, a DEA model with the following 
characteristics was chosen: 
1. Constant Return to Scale. It was assumed that outputs change 
proportionally to input increases/reductions. According to Moesen and 
Persoon (2002), this assumption results in a stricter efficient frontier – what is 
judged to be more appropriate for the present study.  
2. Output-oriented. Because the goal is to evaluate which units 
performed better with their available resources. As explained by Katharaki 
and Tsakas (2010), the output-oriented was always the choice on DEA 
studies for tax office performance evaluation. 
3. Mathematical formulation.  The DEA constant return to scale model 
was first introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). The 
mathematical representation for its output-oriented model, assuming constant 
return to scale, is explained by Camanho (1999) as the following. 
Equation 1 - DEA constant return to scale output-oriented 'weights' model 
Min ℎ௝బ ൌ  ෍ 𝑣௜𝑥௜௝బ
௠
௜ୀଵ
 
s.t. ෍ 𝑢௥𝑦௥௝బ ൌ 1
௦
௥ୀଵ
 
෍ 𝑢௥𝑦௥௝ െ
௦
௥ୀଵ
 ෍ 𝑣௜𝑥௜௝
௠
௜ୀଵ
 ൑ 0 
j = 1,…,n 
r = 1,…,s 
i = i,…,m 
 
𝑢௥ ൒ 𝜀, 
𝑣௜ ൒ 𝜀 
Source: Camanho (1999) 
With x and y being the set of inputs and outputs, respectively, the 
formulation above is known as weights formulation of the DEA model, with ur 
as the weight attached to the former and vi to the latter. The weights depend 
“on the scaling of each input and output” and the model uses ‘virtual’ inputs 
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and outputs23. “The mathematical infinitesimal (ε) is used to ensure that all 
inputs and outputs included in the model are taken into account.”24  
The model above can be written in an envelopment formulation as 
follows:  
Equation 2 - DEA output-oriented 'envelopment' model 
ቌ෍ 𝜆௝∗𝑥௜௝, ෍ 𝜆௝∗𝑦௥௝
௡
௝ୀଵ
௡
௝ୀଵ
ቍ 
𝑀𝐴𝑋 ℎ௝బ ൌ  𝛿଴ ൅ 𝜀 ൭෍ 𝑆௜
௠
௜ୀଵ
൅ ෍ 𝑆௥
௦
௥ୀଵ
൱ 
𝑠. 𝑡. ෍ 𝜆௝
௡
௝ୀଵ
𝑥௜௝ ൅ 𝑠௜ ൌ 𝑥௜௝బ ,               i ൌ 1,…,m 
𝛿଴𝑦௥௝బ െ ෍ 𝜆௝𝑦௥௝ ൅ 𝑠௥
௡
௝ୀଵ
ൌ 0,          r ൌ 1,…,s 
𝜆௝, 𝑠௜, 𝑠௥ ൒ 0,                          ∀j,i,r 
Source: (Camanho 1999) 
 In this formulation, si and sr are the so-called slacks – variables that 
“indicate the extent to which individual inputs or outputs could be improved 
over and above the amount indicated by the efficiency score.”25 
A DMU is efficient if it results in 1 𝛿଴∗⁄ ൌ 1, and has no positive slack 
values.  
The model also offers a possibility to analyze inefficient DMUs by 
assessing a set of targets that would make them efficient. These targets are 
assessed as the following: 
 
                                            
23 Represented by Camanho (1999) as vi*xij0 and ur*yrj0, respectively. 
24 Camanho (1999), 31. 
25 Ibid., 33.  
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Equation 3 - Targets for output-oriented model 
𝑥௜௝బை் ൌ 𝑥௜௝బ െ 𝑠௜∗ ൌ ෍ 𝜆௝∗
௡
௝ୀଵ
𝑥௜௝; 
𝑦௥௝బை் ൌ 𝛿଴∗𝑦௥௝బ ൅ 𝑠௥∗ ൌ ෍ 𝜆௝∗
௡
௝ୀଵ
𝑦௥௝ 
Source: (Camanho 1999) 
To apply the chosen method, Open Source DEA software26 was used. 
The findings are shown on the next chapter. 
  
                                            
26 Available at http://www.opensourcedea.org/ 
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4. Findings 
The study results are presented in the following steps: 1) an overall 
examination of performance scores, 2) an analysis of best and worst 
performers in one year, 3) a comparison between actual and potential outputs 
and 4) a discussion on geographical influence on performance. 
4.1. Performance Scores Distribution and Frequency 
According to the DEA model, an efficient tax office will have a score 
equal to 1. The smaller the score, the more inefficient a unit is compared to an 
efficient DMU.  
The analysis of score distribution and frequency shows a considerable 
number of inefficient units. As can be seen in Chart 3, there are units with 
scores as low as 0.1 in the years 2012 and 2013.  
Chart 3 - Score distribution 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
≤ 0.1 0 0 0 1 1 
0.1< x ≤ 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 
0.2 < x ≤ 0.3 1 8 2 1 1 
0.3 < x ≤ 0.4 3 22 7 6 6 
0.4 < x ≤ 0.5 17 19 13 21 11 
0.5 < x ≤ 0.6 23 21 25 20 24 
0.6 < x ≤ 0.7 16 9 19 21 18 
0.7 < x ≤ 0.8 12 5 11 11 17 
0.8 < x ≤ 0.9 5 5 6 5 8 
0.9 < x ≤ 1 16 4 11 10 10 
Total 94 94 95 97 97 
Source: OpenSource DEA; MS Excel 2010 
Chart 4 shows that the percentage of units with scores below 0.4 
increased from 5% in 2009 to 9% in 2013 – peaking at 33% in 2010. In other 
words, a third of the RFB’s units performed 40% below their potential when 
compared to efficient units in 2010.  
As for the top performing units (scores between 0.9 and 1), their 
frequency decreased from 17% in 2009 to 10% in 2012 and 2013, which 
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indicates a worsening trend. Moreover, in 2010 only 4% of the 94 DMUs 
analyzed performed as high as 0.9. 
Chart 4 - Score frequency 
Scores 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
≤ 0.4 5% 33% 11% 9% 9% 
0.4 < x ≤ 0.7 60% 52% 60% 64% 55% 
0.7 < x ≤ 0.9 18% 11% 18% 16% 26% 
0.9 < x ≤ 1 17% 4% 12% 10% 10% 
Source: OpenSource DEA; MS Excel 2010 
Finally, the examination of Chart 4 indicates that throughout the 5 
years of study, the majority of RFB’s local units were performing at 
intermediate levels – with scores between 0.4 and 0.7. 
4.2. DEA Analysis 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, there are few local units 
working at an efficient level (scores equal to 1). In 2009, there were only 6 
efficient units out of a total of 94. These DMUs are shown in Chart 5 below. 
Chart 5 - Efficient DMUs - 2009 
 Inputs Outputs
DMU Auditors Analyst Formsrevised 
Inspection 
Procedures Score 
DRF61 362 103 16647 1477 1 
DRF51 203 63 9366 1646 1 
DRF24 99 62 8822 938 1 
DRF819 70 51 8247 400 1 
DRF610 18 6 488 197 1 
DRF35 10 12 489 140 1 
Source: COGEP; Acao Fiscal; OpenSource DEA; MS Excel 2010 
These units are the model’s best performers, and serve as a reference 
for other units. On the other hand, Chart 6 shows the results of units with 
scores lower than 0.4. It illustrates the key aspects of a DEA assessment.  
The model indicates, for example, that when compared with efficient 
DMUs, unit DRF17 produced only a third (score 0.33) of possible outputs for 
its given set of inputs in 2009. The unit executed 416 form assessments and 
94 inspection procedures, but if it was to perform as an efficient unit, the 
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outputs should have been the 1268 and 286, respectively. These values are 
the output targets found by the DEA model for each inefficient office. 
Chart 6 - Worst Performing Units - 2009 
 DMU  
DRF08 DRF96 DRF17 DRF09 DRF65 Total 
1. Performance Score 0.11 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.40  
2. Forms assessed  230 683 416 1081 1790  
2.1 Target 2089 2323 1268 3003 4486  
Difference from target 1859 1640 852 1922 2696 8969 
3. Inspection procedures  74 321 94 102 308  
3.1 Target 672 1092 286 283 772  
Difference from target 598 771 192 181 464 2206 
4. Analyst 73 152 24 28 59  
Input Slack 15 58 0 7 0 80 
Source: COGEP; Acao Fiscal; OpenSource DEA; MS Excel 2010 
Similarly, the DRF96 could increase its output by 1640 forms assessed 
and 771 inspection procedures. The difference in this case is the input slack: 
even after the proportional increase of outputs by performance score, this unit 
would still be inefficient. Due to the fact that it cannot achieve further 
increases in output, the DRF96 would need to reduce its number of Tax 
Analysts to become efficient. In conclusion, to become efficient the unit needs 
not only for their outputs to increase, but also to reduce the number of tax 
analysts by 58.  
The analysis made for the year 2009 can similarly be extended to 
2010-2013 period.  
4.3. Potential vs. Actual Outputs 
The output targets represent the potential production an inefficient 
office can deliver if it works as an efficient unit. Graph 3 gives a comparison 
between observed and potential number of returns forms revised from 2009 to 
2013.  
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Graph 3 - Actual vs. Potential outputs for return forms assessment 
  
The potential capacity to assess personal tax returns within the RFB 
leveled off at around 400,000 between 2011 and 2013. However, the number 
of assessed forms never reached 300,000 in this period. The Graph’s 
secondary axis indicates the percentage of the potential output was actually 
executed in each year – this figure never reached the 70% level throughout 
the 5 years analyzed. 
Similarly, the total number of inspection procedures executed stayed at 
around 65% of potential output for the whole period – reaching a minimum 
percentage of 51% in 2010.  
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Graph 4 - Actual vs. Potential Outputs for Inspection Procedures 
 
Source: OpenSource DEA; MS Excel 2010 
4.4. Performance vs. Geography 
A secondary objective of the present study is to evaluate whether or 
not RFB’s geographic-driven organization influences tax inspection 
performance. In order to do so, this subchapter analyzes the geographical 
characteristics of both top 10 and bottom 10 performers according to the 
model. 
The first step was to evaluate any possible correlation between the 
local office’s overall performance and its distance from the corresponding 
regional unit. The rationale behind this test comes from the perception that 
the farther a local unit is from its Regional Office, the lower the capacity of the 
DMU to retain staff, and consequently, its working specialization. 
Having sorted the list of DMUs by the weighted mean of their 
performance scores, the regression in Graph 5 shows that there is no 
correlation between a DMU performance and distance from the respective 
regional office. 
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Graph 5 - Performance Scores vs. Distance from Regional Office 
 
Source: OpenSource DEA; MS Excel 2010 
Nevertheless, it is possible to note some key geographic features in the 
top 10 and bottom 10 performers. Graph 6 displays the fiscal region in which 
the top performers are located. According to the model, 60% of top 
performers are located in the 8th fiscal region – which corresponds to the state 
of Sao Paulo. 
Graph 6 - Fiscal Region, Top 10 Performers 
 Source: OpenSource DEA; MS Excel 2010 
The 8th fiscal region is the RFB’s densest in terms of local offices and 
staff. Taking the year 2011 as an example, the region’s local office density 
was one per 11,820 square kilometers. As for staff density, the figure was one 
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worker (either tax auditor or analyst) per 104 square kilometers. Chart 7 
shows the density for 2011. 
Chart 7 - Staff and DMU Density per Fiscal Region in 2011 
FISCAL 
REGION 
AREA 
(km2) 
LOCAL 
UNITS STAFF 
UNITS 
DENSITY 
(km2/Unit) 
STAFF 
DENSITY 
(km2/Staff) 
8th FR 248,222 21 2396 11,820 104 
7th FR 89,875 6 829 14,979 108 
9th FR 295,044 11 1533 26,822 192 
10th FR 281,730 9 1213 31,303 232 
4th FR 235,207 6 704 39,201 334 
6th FR 586,522 12 1322 48,877 444 
3th FR 732,435 8 657 91,554 1,115 
5th FR 586,648 6 654 97,775 897 
1st FR 1,884,124 7 921 269,161 2,046 
2nd FR 3,575,956 9 640 397,328 5,587 
Source: COGEP; IBGE27 
Conversely, the 1st and 2nd fiscal regions are the Secretariat’s least 
dense. In these fiscal regions, there was one local office for every 269,161 
and 397,328 square kilometers, respectively. In terms of staff, the referred to 
regions also show small density with one worker for every 2,046 square 
kilometers in the 1st fiscal region and one per 5,587 in the 2nd. 
It appears to be no coincidence that the 1st and 2nd FRs together 
account for 60% of the study’s bottom 10 performers (as shown in Graph 7). 
Although it is not possible to directly correlate density of local units and staff 
to tax inspection efficiency, the characteristics of best and worst performers 
suggest that the analyzed density may influence in the way a DMU will 
perform that tax function.   
                                            
27 http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/geociencias/areaterritorial/principal.shtm. Accessed in 
July/2013. 
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Graph 7 - Fiscal Region, Bottom 10 Performers  
 Source: OpenSource DEA; MS Excel 2010 
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5. Conclusions and Final Remarks 
Public organizations are under constant pressure to reach higher levels 
of working efficiency. With decreasing human resources and growing service 
demand, these institutions have no option but to find new ways of executing 
their activities more efficiently. 
In the case of RFB, a great part of this effort is reflected in 
modifications of its organizational structure. The Secretariat innovated by 
creating offices according to functions and taxpayer types. Also, activities 
previously completed by the network of operational offices were shifted to 
regional groups, and more initiatives are expected to come. 
The present research has aimed to serve as a basis for these future 
transformations. The main purpose of the study was to evaluate local offices 
according to their tax inspection performances for the 2009-2013 period. 
By ranking the local tax offices, the Secretariat can: a) identify which 
units are working at higher levels of efficiency; b) pinpoint the location of these 
high-performing units and study their management features; and c) in case of 
organizational changes, evaluate how to expand the identified best 
management practices for the new institutional arrangement. 
The results show that around 10% of analyzed offices are currently 
performing 40% below their potential in terms of tax inspection. The 
Secretariat has an immediate opportunity to act on the management of these 
units in order to improve tax inspection outputs. 
Concerning the total output, the study indicates the studied local offices 
are performing at around 65% of potential output. In other words, there would 
be room to increase tax inspection by 35% if inefficient units worked as 
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efficiently as their peers. Even though it is not realistic to imagine an institution 
with all its units operating at maximum efficiency levels, this figure indicates 
that feasible management modifications would lead to considerable 
improvement in results. 
The second objective of the study was to investigate whether or not 
performance was somehow related to the RFB’s geographic organization. A 
correlation test between a unit’s performance and its distance from the 
respective regional office showed no significant correlation between these 
variables. 
Even though the remoteness of a local office doesn’t seem to influence 
working efficiency, some regional features appear to do so. When looking at 
the characteristics of the fiscal region where the local offices are located, it 
became clear that the majority of the overall top performing units were located 
in a region with a high density of local offices. Conversely, the overall worst 
performers are located in the two lowest dense regions in terms of units.  
This finding seems to be important for the Secretariat, as recent 
changes in the tax inspection field have been shifting this function’s 
management and execution to groups that are regionally centered. If this 
modification trend is to continue, the RFB will need to evaluate whether office 
density is a variable to be taken into account. 
The application of Data Envelopment Analysis has proved to be a very 
useful evaluation tool, and it is possible to imagine its further use in the 
Secretariat. Future researches could, for example, use the method taking into 
account other tax functions executed by local offices. Also, the DEA input-
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oriented methodology could promote fairer distribution of resources, 
reallocating staff and other resources based on DEA’s efficiency results. 
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APPENDIX A – List of DMUs 
DMU Years DMU  Years DMU Years 
DRF16 All 5 years DRF63 All 5 years DRF816 All 5 years 
DRF11 All 5 years DRF54 All 5 years DRF811 All 5 years 
DRF12 All 5 years DRF55 All 5 years DRF812 All 5 years 
DRF13 All 5 years DRF56 All 5 years DRF813 All 5 years 
DRF14 All 5 years DRF61 All 5 years DRF814 All 5 years 
DRF15 All 5 years DRF62 All 5 years DRF815 All 5 years 
DRF17 All 5 years DRF64 All 5 years DRF817 All 5 years 
DRF21 All 5 years DRF65 All 5 years DRF818 All 5 years 
DRF22 All 5 years DRF66 All 5 years DRF819 All 5 years 
DRF23 All 5 years DRF67 All 5 years DRF820 All 5 years 
DRF24 All 5 years DRF68 All 5 years DRF821 All 5 years 
DRF25 All 5 years DRF69 All 5 years DRF91 All 5 years 
DRF26 All 5 years DRF610 All 5 years DRF92 All 5 years 
DRF27 All 5 years DRF611 All 5 years DRF93 All 5 years 
DRF28 All 5 years DRF612 All 5 years DRF94 All 5 years 
DRF29 All 5 years DRF71 2012, 2013 DRF95 All 5 years 
DRF31 All 5 years DRF72 All 5 years DRF96 All 5 years 
DRF32 All 5 years DRF73 All 5 years DRF97 All 5 years 
DRF33 All 5 years DRF74 All 5 years DRF98 All 5 years 
DRF34 All 5 years DRF75 All 5 years DRF99 All 5 years 
DRF35 All 5 years DRF76 All 5 years DRF910 All 5 years 
DRF36 All 5 years DRF77 2011 to 2013 DRF911 All 5 years 
DRF37 All 5 years DRF78 All 5 years DRF01 All 5 years 
DRF38 All 5 years DRF81 All 5 years DRF02 All 5 years 
DRF41 All 5 years DRF82 All 5 years DRF03 All 5 years 
DRF42 All 5 years DRF83 All 5 years DRF04 All 5 years 
DRF43 All 5 years DRF84 All 5 years DRF05 All 5 years 
DRF44 All 5 years DRF85 All 5 years DRF06 All 5 years 
DRF45 All 5 years DRF86 All 5 years DRF07 All 5 years 
DRF46 All 5 years DRF87 All 5 years DRF08 All 5 years 
DRF51 All 5 years DRF88 All 5 years DRF09 All 5 years 
DRF52 All 5 years DRF89 All 5 years     
DRF53 All 5 years DRF810 All 5 years     
 
